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Simplifying Discovery and Production: Using Easy Frameworks to Evaluate the 2009 Term of Cases
Lieutenant Colonel Eric Carpenter*
The Basics
Discovery and production rules are fairly simple-if
you can distinguish one from the other, which is not always
an easy task. For example, depending on where you are in
the discovery rules, the word material can have three
different meanings: it can mean a thing, matter, or
information; it can mean matter that is significant to the
preparation of the defense case; or it can describe a test for
prejudice on appellate review. The definition of material
that comes from the Brady v. Maryland' analysis is different
than the definition of material as it is used in Rule for
Courts-Martial (RCM) 701(a)(2).2 Next, practitioners may
have trouble understanding when to apply material as the
test for prejudice for a discovery violation instead of
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Last, practitioners
may have trouble distinguishing military (from RCM
701(a)(2)) and investigative agency (from RCM
701 (a)(6)3/Brady analysis).
Some rules within discovery and production appear
similar and can lend themselves to confusion. Practitioners
might interchange the terms material (from discovery) and
relevant (from production) or they might interchange
military (from discovery) and government (from
production). Both the discovery and production rules have
different procedures for conducting in camera reviews.
Additionally, the definition of necessary in expert assistant
requests (a discovery problem) is different from the
definition of necessary in expert witness requests (a
production problem). The rules often look similar, but the
differences that exist are important because each set of rules
is designed to solve a certain set of problems. In the
simplest terms, discovery rules deal with the preparation
phase of trial, while production rules deal with the
presentation phase of trial. For this reason, discovery rules
should not be used to resolve production issues, and
production rules should not be used to resolve discovery
problems.
This article provides legal practitioners with a set of
tools for recognizing the differences between discovery and
production rules. These tools are then applied to the 2009
term of appellate cases which focused on discovery and
. Judge Advocate, U.S. Army. Curently assigned as Associate Professor,
Criminal Law Department, The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and
School, U.S. Army, Charlottesville, Virginia.
1 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 701(a)(2)
(2008) [hereinafter MCM].
3 Id. R.C.M. 701(a)(6).
production issues in order to illustrate whether the parties,
the military judges, and the courts used sound reasoning in
dealing with these issues. At the conclusion of this article,
practitioners should be able to recognize the difference
between discovery and production rules, to include in
camera reviews; distinguish expert assistants from expert
witnesses; and identify the distinctions between specific
defense discovery requests and RCM 701(a)(6)/Brady
obligations. Finally, the objective of this analysis is to
emphasize a simple but critical point: precision matters.
The Basic Differences Between Discovery and
Production
Fundamentally, discovery rules govern how the parties
will exchange information. The rules for discovery establish
how each party must help the other party to develop the
other party's case.4 Discovery deals with preparation and
investigation. Discovery means finding or learning
something that was previously unknown and is used to
"reveal facts and develop evidence."' A party can seek
discovery and obtain information that might not be not
admitted into evidence at trial. For example, the information
might be used to develop other evidence that the party will
eventually try to admit.
In contrast, production rules focus on presenting
evidence or witnesses at trial. At that point, the party has
been through discovery, gathered facts, and chosen which
facts will be introduced as evidence at trial. The party now
needs the help of compulsory process to bring those facts to
the courtroom-typically through a witness or physical
evidence.
When we look at the RCMs, we see language that
reflects this fundamental difference between discovery and
production. For example, look at the rule that deals with
specific discovery requests from the defense, RCM
701(a)(2)(A). This rule states that when the defense requests
a specific item, then the government must disclose that item
if certain conditions are met.6 One of those potential
conditions is that the item must be "material to the
preparation of the defense." That language deals with
4 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 466 (6th ed. 1990). Discovery includes "the
pre-trial devices that can be used by one party to obtain facts and
information about the case from the other party in order to assist the party's
preparation for trial." Id.
'BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 533 (9th ed. 2009).
6 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 701(a)(2)(A).
7 Id (emphasis added).
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preparation and investigation, not with whether that item
will ultimately be introduced at trial.
Further, the word material in "material to the
preparation of the defense" is defined in the language of
preparation and investigation. Material means "[h]aving
some logical connection with the consequential facts . . . Of
such a nature that knowledge of the item would affect a
person's decision-making process; significant; essential."8
Look at the first phrase in that definition. The matter does
not need to be a consequential fact itself; rather, it only
needs to be logically connected to some other fact of
consequence. Material is not an evidentiary term-it is
broader. The requested item does not have to ultimately be
admitted at trial, but merely contribute to case preparation.
Now look at the second phrase in the definition. Note that
the information does not need to be favorable. Unfavorable
information may be material.9 The defense may need to
know it in order to make informed decisions like how to
plead or what theory of the case has the greatest chance for
success.
Look now at the production rules. These rules do deal
with evidentiary terms. The parties are entitled to the
production of witnesses or evidence that is necessary and
relevant. o The definition of necessary is "not cumulative
and . . . would contribute to a party's presentation of the
evidence in some positive way on a matter in issue."" For
the definition of relevant, the discussion to RCM 701(b) and
(f) points to the definition found in Military Rule of
Evidence (MRE) 401.12 Military Rule of Evidence 401
defines relevance as having "any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence."13 According to
Black's Law Dictionary, relevant means "logically
connected and tending to prove or disprove a matter in issue;
having appreciable probative value-that is, rationally
tending to persuade people of the probability or possibility
of some alleged fact." Unlike the word material, the word
relevant is an evidentiary term.
Another area of confusion between discovery and
production rules deals with what agency has control of the
item or person at issue. For specific discovery requests
under RCM 701(a)(2), the trial counsel only has to disclose
those items within the possession, custody, or control of
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1066 (9 th ed. 2009).
9 United States v. Adens, 56 M.J. 724 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2002).
10 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 703(b) and (f).
"' Id. R.C.M. 703(b)(1) discussion.
12 Id. R.C.M. 703(b) discussion, 703(f) discussion.
13 Id. MIL. R. EVID. 401.
military authorities.14 If the item that the defense requests
under RCM 701(a)(2) is not within military possession,
custody, or control, the trial counsel does not have an
obligation to find it for the accused. This rule is narrower
than the production rules. To compare, under RCM 703, if
the witness or evidence is necessary and relevant, then the
government has to produce the witness or evidence,
regardless of what type of person is involved or what agency
or person possesses the evidence.15
Some of this confusion exists in the appellate cases
from the 2009 term. Table 1 in the appendix is based on the
discussion above and lays out the basic differences between
discovery and production.
The Differences Between Discovery and Production In
Camera Reviews
Both the discovery and production rules allow the
military judge to conduct in camera reviews of disputed
matter. Under RCM 701(g)(2), the military judge may
regulate discovery by granting a party relief from a
discovery obligation.16 If one of the parties believes that
complying with a discovery request would be inappropriate,
the party may file a motion with the military judge
requesting in camera review.17 The standard for the moving
party is "a sufficient showing" that "the discovery or
inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred.""
If the party has made a sufficient showing, the military
judge reviews the questionable matter. The military judge
then decides whether the matter is protected or confidential.
If not, the military judge ends the in camera review. If it is
protected, the military judge determines whether the matter
is material to the preparation of the defense. 19 The military
judge may (and probably should) allow the parties to review
the documents while still respecting the protected or
confidential nature of the documents so that the parties can
make informed arguments on whether the matter is material.
The military judge can do this by having the parties review
the matter in the courtroom.2 If the matter is not material,
then the military judge may deny the party that is seeking
discovery from receiving discovery, while ordering any
1Id. R.C.M. 701(a)(2)(A).
1
sId. R.C.M. 703(e), (f).
16 Id. R.C.M. 701(g)(2).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 See generally United States v. Abrams, 50 M.J. 361, 364 (C.A.A.F.
1999).
20 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 182 (1969); Abrams, 50 M.J. at
364.
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other terms and conditions that are just.2 1 If the matter is
material, then the military judge may order disclosure with a
protective order.
The in camera review under the production rules is
different. There, the government has already issued a
subpoena for the evidence,22 so the evidence has already
been determined to be relevant and necessary. However, the
custodian of the evidence-not a party to the case-is now
contesting the subpoena because she believes the subpoena
is unreasonable or oppressive. The military judge may still
direct that the custodian provide the evidence for an in
camera inspection. After reviewing the matter, the military
judge has the option to withdraw the subpoena.23 If the
military judge does so, then the party that was denied the
evidence can seek a remedy for unavailable evidence under
RCM 703(f)(1). 24
One of the cases in the 2009 term involved an in camera
review under discovery analysis. Table 2 in the appendix
outlines the differences between discovery and production
in-camera reviews.
The Differences Between Expert Assistants and Expert
Witnesses
When practitioners categorize "expert assistants," they
often lump the topic in with the expert witness analysis that
is found in RCM 703(d). Look closely, though, because
RCM 703(d) does not discuss expert assistants. In reality,
the analysis for expert assistance requests is much more
similar to the analysis of discovery issues than production
issues. Expert assistants are commonly used to help the
defense evaluate scientific or technical evidence during the
preparation phase of trial when the defense is still building
its case. Expert witnesses arrive at the presentation phase of
trial when the defense knows what it wishes to put before the
fact finder.
As an illustration of the different purposes served by
expert assistants and expert witnesses, the analysis for expert
assistance requests differs from that for expert witnesses, 25
21 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 701(g). If the military judge denies the party
that seeks discovery from getting discovery, then the matter needs to be
attached to the record. Id. R.C.M. 701(g)(2).
22 Id. R.C.M. 703(f)(4)(C).
23 Id.
24 United States v. Rodriguez, 57 M.J. 765 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2002).
25 The analysis for adequate substitutes is pretty much the same in both
expert assistance and expert witness analysis. Compare United States v.
Anderson, 68 M.J. 378 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (expert assistance) and United
States v. Warner, 62 M.J. 114 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (expert assistance), with
United States v. Bumette, 29 M.J. 473 (C.M.A. 1990) (expert witness) and
United States v. Robinson, 43 M.J. 501 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995) (expert
witness).
particularly in the definition of necessary. The defense is
entitled to an expert assistant or other investigative help
when that assistance is necessary for an adequate defense.
The test has two parts. The defense must show that there is
a reasonable probability that (1) an expert would be of
assistance to the defense and (2) the denial of expert
assistance would lead to a fundamentally unfair trial.26 For
the first prerequisite, the defense must show why the expert
assistance is needed, what the expert would accomplish for
the defense, and why the defense cannot do the work
themselves.27
The test for the production of an expert witness is
essentially the same as the test for producing any other
witness: the expert's testimony must be relevant and
28
necessary. Here, necessary takes on the familiar definition
found in the production rules: "not cumulative and . . .
would contribute to a party's presentation of the evidence in
some positive way on a matter in issue."29 Again, the
definition of necessary here has to do with presenting
evidence at trial. In contrast, the definition of necessary
under expert assistance analysis has more to do with trial
preparation.
Two of the cases in the 2009 term dealt with expert
assistance requests. See Table 3 in the appendix for an
outline of the differences between expert assistance and
expert witnesses.
The Differences Between Specific Discovery Requests and
RCM 701(a) (6)/Brady Obligations
Within the discovery rules, there are three major topics
of confusion: the test for what to disclose; where the
government has to look; and the standard of review on
appeal. The preceding paragraphs discussed the test for
what to disclose after a specific discovery request under
RCM 701(a)(2): both favorable and unfavorable matters
that are material to defense preparation. This standard
reflects the underlying purpose of discovery requests: case
investigation and preparation. In contrast, the standard for
unsolicited disclosure under RCM 701(a)(6)/Brady is much
narrower: favorable evidence only.30 This narrow disclosure
requirement reflects the narrower purpose of the RCM
701 (a)(6)/Brady rules:
26 United States v. Freeman, 65 M.J. 451 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
27 United States v. Gonzalez, 39 M.J. 459 (C.M.A. 1991).
28 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 703(d).
29 Id. R.C.M. 703(b)(1) discussion. When conducting "relevant and
necessary" analysis, courts can consider the factors found in United States
v. Houser. 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1990).
30 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 701(a)(6).
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The purpose of the Brady rule is not to
provide a defendant with a complete
disclosure of all evidence in the
government's file which might
conceivably assist him in preparation of
his defense, but to assure that he will not
be denied access to exculpatory evidence
known to the government but unknown to
him.31
For trial counsel who have to decide whether something is
favorable, RCM 701(a)(6) states that the benefit of the doubt
goes to the defense: the government needs to disclose the
evidence if it reasonably tends to be favorable.32
Next, the rules differ on where the government has to
look for such evidence. Under RCM 701(a)(2), while the
government only has to search in military files, it has to look
in all military files, and not just investigative files. Under
RCM 701(a)(6)/Brady, the government has to look beyond
military files, but only has to look in the government's
investigative files, which includes the files of the trial
counsel, the files of investigative agencies that were
involved with the case or were closely aligned to the case,
and files of the investigative agencies of unrelated or
tangential investigations (if the defense provides notice of
those files).33 These files also include the personnel files of
military and civilian investigators if necessary for
34impeachment purposes.
A serious point of confusion comes from the term
material. For example, RCM 701(a)(2) uses this term to
explain what types of items require disclosure. Additionally,
the term material also appears in the RCM 701(a)(6)/Brady
analysis-but in this context, the term applies to an analysis
of error, as to whether the government should have disclosed
an item favorable to the defense but did not do so. Under
RCM 701(a)(6) and Army Regulation 27-26, the
government must disclose evidence that reasonably tends to
be favorable to the accused.35
If the government fails to disclose favorable evidence,
then the first question on review is whether there was a
discovery request under RCM 701. If the defense made a
discovery request under RCM 701 and the government
failed to disclose favorable evidence, then the test on appeal
31 United States v. Ruggiero, 472 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1973).
32 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 701(a)(6).
3 United States v. Williams, 50 M.J. 436, 441 (C.A.A.F. 1999); United
States v. Veksler, 62 F.3d 544 (3d Cir. 1995).
34 United States v. Green, 37 M.J. 88 (C.M.A. 1993).
35 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 701(a)(6); U.S. DEP'T ARMY, AR 27-26,
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS para. 3.8(d) (1 May
1992).
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.3 6 If the defense did
not make a discovery request under RCM 701, then the
failure to disclose violates due process under Brady if the
evidence was material, that is, there is a reasonable
probability that there would have been a different result at
trial had the evidence been disclosed.37
Note that in the military, material is a retrospective
term. At the trial level, the test is not whether the evidence
is favorable and material. At the trial level, the government
must always disclose evidence that reasonably tends to be
favorable, whether or not that evidence might later be found
to be material.
Some confusion on these issues exists in the cases from
the 2009 term. Table 4 in the appendix illustrates the
differences between RCM 701(a)(2) specific discovery
requests under and RCM 701 (a)(6)/Brady obligations.
Comparing these various rules to each other raises an
interesting point. Gaps exist between the areas covered by
discovery rules and production rules. For example, perhaps
a defense counsel believes his client suffered an adverse
reaction from a new medication. The defense counsel wants
to review reports made to the Food and Drug Administration
to see if others have had similar reactions. Can the defense
counsel get these reports under RCM 701? Probably not, as
RCM 701(a)(2) does not provide a mechanism because the
36 United States v. Roberts, 59 M.J. 323 (C.A.A.F. 2004). The standard
arose during a period when the wake of the 1963 Brady decision had not yet
settled. In 1976, the Supreme Court described three situations that might
each have heightened (but different) levels of materiality analysis
(prosecutorial misconduct, specific defense discovery requests, and general
discovery requests), but did not explain what level of analysis applied to
specific discovery requests. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). In
1985, the Supreme Court decided that general and specific discovery
requests did not warrant any heighted materiality analysis. United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). Military appellate courts noted that the
Supreme Court case law only set the constitutional minimums, and that
Congress and the President can provide greater protections, and had in fact
done so with Article 46 and RCM 701. United States v. Eshalomi, 23 M.J.
12 (C.M.A. 1986); United States v. Hart, 29 M.J. 407 (C.M.A. 1990);
Roberts, 59 M.J. 323. Therefore, the military appellate courts reasoned, a
heightened standard should apply to specific discovery requests to help
protect "the broad nature of discovery rights granted the military accused
under Article 46." Id. at 327. Note that this heightened standard is
associated with Article 46 and RCM 701 and does not derive from Brady.
37 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995); Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769
(2009).
38 In pure Brady analysis, the term "material" has migrated from being a
retrospective test for prejudice to part of the prospective test on whether a
violation has occurred. Bell, 129 S. Ct. at 1782-84. However, Brady only
represents the constitutional floor. Jurisdictions are free to adopt broader
discovery obligations. The military, like many jurisdictions, has done so by
adopting a "reasonably tends to negate" standard in procedural rules or
ethical rules (or in the case of the military, both) that contain this broader
standard. MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 701(a)(6); AR27-26, supra note 35,
para. 3.8(d) (1 May 1992); see Bell, 129 S. Ct. at 1783 n.15. Military
practitioners should first analyze the failure to provide favorable
information under R.C.M. 701(a)(6). Constitutional Brady analysis is
secondary.
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reports are not in the possession, custody, or control of
military authorities. Rule for Court-Martial 701(a)(6)/Brady
also does not provide a mechanism. Even if there were
favorable matter in the reports, the trial counsel is not
obligated to disclose them because the reports are not in the
investigative files of a law enforcement agency that is
somehow related to the case.
The defense counsel would have to rely on the
production rules in RCM 703. While the files are subject to
production without subpoena because they are under
government control, the defense counsel may not be able to
make a compelling argument about why the matter is
relevant and necessary or be able to say where it is when
defense counsel has not seen the matter. At this stage, the
defense has no other way to obtain the matter than to request
it like any member of the public. A similar issue exists in
one of the cases from last term, which will be discussed in
the next section.
With these distinctions in mind, we can now look at the
discovery and production cases from the 2009 appellate
term, review the legal issues raised by the facts of each case,
and apply critical thought to the various opinions issued by
the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) and the
Army Court of Criminal Appeals (ACCA).
Application to the 2009 Term of Cases
Discovery
In most cases, parties find out about RCM 701(a)(2) and
RCM 701(a)(6)/Brady violations either before trial (raising
the question of whether a continuance is required) or on
appeal (triggering the analysis of whether the newly
discovered evidence should have been disclosed and if the
accused was prejudiced by nondisclosure). The case of
United States v. TriguerOS39 is somewhat unique because it
involved an analysis of potential discovery violations found
during the presentencing proceeding.
Trigueros was charged with the indecent assault of the
wife of a Soldier in his unit (Victim 1) and the rape of one of
his wife's friends (Victim 2). The defense made a specific
discovery request for both victims' mental health records.
The trial counsel responded with, "[t]he Government is not
aware of the existence of any such documentation." 4 0 The
problem is that the trial counsel did not actually look, and
the records did exist.
Trigueros was subsequently convicted at a bench trial.
During the presentencing proceeding, Victim 2 stated that
she had previously seen mental health professionals. The
defense asked for a continuance to review the records. The
military judge granted the continuance and ordered the trial
counsel to produce the records for in camera review under
RCM 701(g)(2). 4 1
Here is a good place to look at the appendix. Looking
at Table 4, two potential discovery violations occurred: a
violation of RCM 701(a)(2) because the defense specifically
requested this type of matter; and a violation of RCM
701(a)(6)/Brady because this information could reasonably
tend to be favorable to the defense.
When there is a specific discovery request, note that the
government must disclose certain things if those things are
in the possession, custody, and control of military
authorities. The first question of the analysis should
therefore be, "Where were the records located?" If the
records were in a civilian clinic, then there would not be a
violation of RCM 701(a)(2).
We should ask the same question for a potential RCM
701(a)(6)/Brady violation. Looking again at Table 4, the
government must disclose certain matters that are found
within the prosecutor's files, related law enforcement files,
or unrelated law enforcement files if the government was
specifically told about those files by the defense. If these
records were not in a prosecution or law enforcement file,
then they were not subject to RCM 701(a)(6)/Brady
disclosure.
However, the Trigueros opinion never stated where
these records were located. If the files were not under
military control or in an investigative file, then the analysis
should have ended. There would have been no discovery
violation. This goes back to a critical point: precision
matters.
Now, if the records were in a civilian file, the defense
counsel would still have had some options. If the defense
counsel had asked Victim 2 during interviews whether she
had been to a counselor and had learned that records those
existed, then the defense could have sought production of
those records under RCM 703. If the defense had
questioned the victim on this issue, then the defense would
have been able to include a sufficient description of the
42documents to show that they were relevant and necessary.
As defense counsel was surprised at trial by the existence of
the victims' mental health records, it appears from the record
that the defense never interviewed the victims on this point.
Turning to the military judge's analysis, the military
judge reviewed the records in camera under RCM 701(g).
4 1 Id. at 607-08.
42 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 703(f)(3).
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3 69 M.J. 604 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2010).
40 Id. at 607.
35
Looking at Table 2 of the appendix and noting the unique
procedural posture of the issue, the military judge generally
conducted the in camera review consistent with RCM
701(g). The military judge stated that he did not find
anything particularly relevant, but also allowed each side to
review the records-a method that courts have endorsed.43
The defense argued that these records were material to the
preparation of the defense under RCM 701(a)(2) because
had the defense known about this information, the defense
might have sought a pretrial agreement. The military judge
rejected this argument, stating that the parties were never
close to an agreement. However, the military judge appears
to have analyzed the problem under the favorable test found
under RCM 701(a)(6)/Brady rather than the material test
found under RCM 701 (a)(2).44
The defense then moved for a mistrial based on Brady.
The military judge recalled Victim 2 as a witness, took more
testimony, and then made findings of fact on each issue
raised by the defense. Everything that was asked while the
victim was on the stand could have been obtained in a
defense pretrial interview. Looking at Table 4 and the
potential RCM 701(a)(6)/Brady violation, note the
government must disclose matter that reasonably tends to be
favorable and is found in the right files. Here, the military
judge applied the RCM 701 (a)(6)/Brady test and noted three
pieces of evidence that might have been favorable.45
From that point, the military judge, with the
concurrence of the parties, essentially acted as an appellate
court.46 The military judge checked for prejudice by
applying the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard.47
Looking at Table 4, we see that this is the correct standard
for reviewing potential violations of specific discovery
requests under RCM 701. The military judge found that the
nondisclosure of each potentially favorable piece of
evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.48
After conducting that review, the military judge denied
the motion for a mistrial but granted other remedies
available under RCM 701(g)(3). Specifically, the military
judge prohibited the government from presenting victim
impact evidence or any other aggravation evidence in its
sentencing case-in-chief 49
43 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 182 (1969); United States v.
Abrams, 50 M.J. 361, 364 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
44 Trigueros, 69 M.J. at 608.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 608 n.4.
47 Id. at 608.
48 id.
49 id.
The ACCA agreed with the military judge's reasoning.
The court found that the government violated RCM 701 by
not disclosing matter that was specifically requested, but
concluded that the nondisclosure was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. The court went further and found that the
records were not favorable under Brady.o However, the
court did not analyze whether these mental health records
were in the possession, custody and control of military
authorities (for a possible RCM 701(a)(2) violation) or
whether the records were in an investigative file (for a
possible RCM 701(a)(6)/Brady violation).
This case has three main lessons. First, the military
judge effectively handled a potential discovery violation that
arose in an unusual place: post-merits but pre-appeals. The
military judge handled the in-camera problem fairly well by
allowing the parties to review the matter so that they could
refine their arguments. He also recalled the witness to build
a complete record; conducted RCM 701(a)(2) and RCM
701(a)(6)/Brady analysis; granted a defense continuance;
and crafted a meaningful remedy for any potential discovery
violations.
Second, this problem might have been easily resolved
by an analysis of the files' location. If the files were in a
civilian clinic, then the government would have been under
no obligation to locate them for the defense under either
RCM 701(a)(2) or RCM 701(a)(6)/Brady. Precision matters.
Third, when a trial counsel receives a discovery request,
the trial counsel needs to act on it with due diligence. The
court gave counsel this admonition:
We take this opportunity to reiterate the
government's duty with regard to the
disclosure of evidence in response to
specific requests by the defense . . .
Though the government's response that it
was "not aware of the existence" of Mrs.
SCR's medical records in this case was
technically true, it was only because trial
counsel failed to actually ask Mrs. SCR if
she had previously attended mental health
counseling. Rule for Courts-Martial 701
requires the prosecution "engage in 'good
faith efforts' to obtain the [requested]
material." Williams, 50 M.J. at 441;
R.C.M. 701(a)(2) . . . The government
cannot intentionally remain ignorant and
then claim it exercised due diligence.52
Id. at 608-11.
5 Id. at 608.
52 Id. at 611.
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In this case, the trial counsel should have asked the victims
if these records existed. If the records existed and they were
in an investigative file or under the military's control, then
the trial counsel should have disclosed them to defense. If
the records existed but were not in one of these files, then
the trial counsel could have denied the request, and the
defense could have then requested production of the files
under RCM 703. And, if the trial counsel believed the
request was inappropriate, the trial counsel could have
sought relief from the military judge under RCM 701 (g)(2).
The court took their discovery admonition further, and
appeared to place an obligation on the trial counsel to
disclose records even if they are not located in a file covered
by the rules:
In this case and others like it where there
is no dispute over the relevance of the
requested material, due diligence requires
trial counsel to ask each victim whether
she has attended any mental health
counseling sessions, investigate the
existence of any medical records, and
obtain them, employing a subpoena or
other compulsory process where
necessary.53
That statement is not accurate: the court confused the
discovery rules with the production rules. Under the
discovery rules, the trial counsel is under no obligation to
obtain records that are located in files not covered by those
discovery rules. If the matter is in files that are beyond the
reach of discovery rules, the defense can submit a proper
production request under RCM 703. The government will
then have options or obligations that flow from that request.
Production ofEvidence
Where Trigueros dealt with discovery, United States v.
Graner54 dealt with production. Graner was one of the
Soldiers at the center of the Abu Ghraib scandal. Graner
was charged with conspiracy to commit maltreatment,
maltreatment of detainees, and dereliction of duty for failing
to protect detainees from abuse.
As part of case development, the defense counsel made
a discovery request for a particular Department of Defense
(DoD) report. The government denied that request.5 6 The
defense then made a motion to compel production of this
53 Id.
54 69 M.J. 104 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
ss Id. at 105-06. Graner was also charged with various assaults and an
indecent act. Id.
5 6 Id. at 106.
report. Note that the defense counsel did not file a motion
to compel discovery; rather, the defense skipped over that
option and filed a motion to compel production. Look at
Table 1 and note that by doing so, the defense raised their
standard from material to the preparation of the defense to
the higher standard of necessary and relevant. This perhaps
unintentional choice will become important later.
When litigating the production request before the
military judge, the defense broadened their request to
include memorandums that related to the legal status of the
detainees. The defense theory was that Graner was only
acting as part of a general command climate that condoned
the humiliating treatment of detainees in order to make them
more likely to give up intelligence. The defense argued that
the documents were needed to establish that the detainees
were not protected by the law of war and therefore could not
be maltreated; to establish that the appellant lacked the state
of mind needed to maltreat because he thought he was just
following orders; and to establish that there was unlawful
command influence. On appeal, Graner stated that these
matters would also support a defense theory that senior
government officials had authorized the type of actions that
Graner committed.
The military judge denied the production request,
stating that the documents were not relevant, but invited the
defense to raise the issue again if they could establish
relevancy.5 9 Looking at Table 1, the military judge applied
the correct test for production: necessary and relevant. The
defense did not revisit the issue during the remainder of the
trial.60
On appeal, the CAAF did not analyze the issue with
much precision. While the court mentioned RCM 701(a)(6)
and Brady,61 the issue of nondisclosure of favorable
evidence was not raised by the parties. The court also
mentioned RCM 701(a)(2), 2 but this rule was not applicable
because the defense never litigated a motion to compel
discovery. The defense only litigated a motion to compel
production.
The court disposed of the requested memorandums by
stating that the defense failed to comply with the
requirements under RCM 703(f)(3). 63 The rule states that
1 Brief for Appellee at 6-7, United States v. Graner, 69 M.J. 104 (C.A.A.F.
2010) (No. 09-0432).
58 Graner, 69 M.J. at 106-08.
s' Id. at 106-07.
6 0 Id. at 107.
61 Id.
62 id.
63 Id.
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any defense request for production of evidence shall list the
items of evidence, including a description of each item
sufficient to show its relevance and necessity, and say where
the government can find it.
Regarding the DoD report, the court turned to the
production rules and focused on whether the report was
relevant under RCM 703. The court found that Graner
provided no evidence that he was adversely affected by a
report that he had never even seen; that he had a duty to
protect detainees under his charge regardless of any views
on the detainees' legal status; and that he never produced
64
any evidence of unlawful command influence. It appears
that the court did not see any connection between Graner's
conduct and whatever command climate may have existed.
To the court, the command climate was irrelevant if Graner
and the other Soldiers involved did not have actual
knowledge about this command climate. Had Graner
presented some evidence that he knew about a particular
command climate, or was directed to do something by
someone who may have been influenced by the command
climate, then the matter might have been relevant.
In his concurrence in part and dissent in part, Judge
Baker pointed out that the defense fell in the "gap" between
the rules that was previously discussed above. Defense
counsel are required to state with specificity something that
they have not been allowed to see and which might even be
classified.65 However, in this case, this "gap" was of the
defense's own making. Note that if the defense had litigated
a motion to compel discovery, the defense would not have
needed to clear that hurdle. In contrast to RCM 703(f)(3),
there is no requirement under RCM 701 (a)(2) to give a more
precise location other than "within the possession, custody,
and control of military authorities." Here, it appears that the
DoD had the documents.
Further, had the defense filed a motion to compel
discovery, the defense could have argued the material
standard under RCM 701(a)(2), which is lower than the
relevant standard under RCM 703. These documents might
have met the material standard because they could affect the
defense's decision-making process. For instance, if the
defense knew that there was nothing there worth pursuing,
then the defense might have sought a different trial strategy
or pursued an offer to plead guilty. Finally, had the defense
litigated the denied discovery request, the standard on appeal
would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Precision matters.
Because of the court's lack of precision, this case
contains some dicta that practitioners should approach with
caution. The lead opinion, the concurring opinion, and the
641 Id. at 108.
65 Graner, 69 M.J. at 112 (Baker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
concurrence in part and dissent in part opinions routinely
interchanged the terms production and discovery. In dicta,
the court even stated that "these rules [R.C.M. 701(a)(2),
R.C.M. 701(a)(6)/Brady, and R.C.M. 703] are themselves
grounded on the fundamental concept of relevance" 66 and
noted that "Professor Wigmore put it over a century ago:
'None but facts having rational probative value are
admissible.' 67  Those statements are true for production
analysis and potentially for RCM 701(a)(6)/Brady analysis, 68
but not for RCM 701(a)(2) analysis. Recall our discussion
above and look at Table 1 again. While material and
relevant may appear to be synonyms, they do not mean the
same thing. Material is a preparation term and is used to
analyze specific discovery requests under RCM 701(a)(2).
Relevant is an evidentiary term and is not used in RCM
701 (a)(2) analysis. Precision matters.
Requests for Expert Assistance
In 2005, the CAAF decided United States v. Warner.69
There, the government secured a top expert in the field
(Expert B), denied the defense request for a similar,
specialized expert (a different Expert B), and then appointed
a generalist to the defense team (Expert A). The court found
that by doing so, the government violated the letter and spirit
of Article 46's guarantee of equal opportunity to obtain
witnesses and other evidence.70
In 2010, the CAAF reviewed another case with similar
facts, United States v. Anderson.7 1  This time, the
government denied the defense request for a specialized
expert (Expert B), appointed the defense a generalist (Expert
A), but then the government called their own specialized
expert (Expert B) on rebuttal.
In 2004, Anderson, a member of the Washington State
National Guard whose unit was mobilizing to go to Iraq,
began exchanging emails with someone he thought was a
Muslim extremist but who was actually a private American
citizen devoted to gathering intelligence on terrorists.
Anderson revealed his unit movements, information on
members of his unit, and training information. The
concerned citizen eventually notified the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), and FBI agents continued the online
6 6 Id. at 107.
67 Id.
68 Rule for Court-Martial 701(a)(6) uses the term "evidence," which is a
trial term in the way that "relevance" is a trial term. MCM, supra note 2,
RCM 701(a)(6).
69 62 M.J. 114 (C.A.A.F. 2005).
7
oId. at 118.
n 68 M.J. 378 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
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dialogue. Anderson forwarded computer disks with, among
other things, classified information on the vulnerabilities of
American tactical vehicles.72
Prior to trial, Anderson was evaluated by a sanity board
and diagnosed with attention deficit disorder and an
unspecified personality disorder. The defense requested a
particular forensic psychologist to serve as an expert
assistant (Expert B, a specialist). The convening authority
and subsequently the military judge denied the request.
After this denial, the defense requested and was granted a
clinical psychologist (Expert A, a generalist). At trial, this
doctor testified that the appellant had Bipolar I Disorder and
an unspecified personality disorder. The government's
cross-examination was limited and did not call into question
the doctor's underlying assertions, but did highlight that he
was not forensic psychologist. The appellant also called a
psychiatrist who diagnosed the appellant with Bipolar I and
Asperger's Syndrome. Both doctors testified that the
accused did not satisfy the conditions necessary for a
successful lack of mental responsibility defense. On
rebuttal, the government called a forensic psychiatrist
(Expert A, a specialist). This expert did not comment on the
first psychologist's assertions, had some minor
disagreements with the second expert, noted that the defense
witnesses' assessments were reasonable, and did not
otherwise attack the credentials of the defense's two
doctors.73
The court reviewed whether the military judge erred by
not appointing the first doctor that the defense requested.
The court applied the test found in Table 3 for expert
assistants. The court essentially found that the defense did
not (and could not) explain why a specialized expert was
needed because the nature of the case did not require a
forensic psychologist or psychiatrist. No issue was raised
that would require the application of psychology to law,
such as lack of mental responsibility or partial mental
responsibility.74 In sum, the defense did not need a
specialized Expert A-a generalist Expert B was good
enough. Further, the appellant did not assert that the
appointed doctor was inadequate.
The court then turned to the apparent unfairness of the
government appointing a generalist (clinical psychologist,
Expert A) to the defense but then calling a specialist (a
forensic psychiatrist, Expert B) in rebuttal. The court stated,
"As a threshold matter we note that Appellant does not
argue, and it is not the law, that having expert type A for
Appellant and expert type B for the Government on rebuttal
is per se unfair."76 The court found that, in this case,
nothing was unfair: the government's rebuttal witness
(Expert B) only offered limited testimony that hardly
prejudiced the accused, let alone beyond a reasonable doubt.
Expert B did not cause an unlevel playing field.
Going forward, however, the fundamental holding in
Warner remains-the government cannot stack the deck by
appointing themselves a specialist but only giving the
defense a generalist, and then using that government
specialist to attack the defense. If the government does this,
then the court will find that the trial was unfair. If a trial
counsel finds herself working with a limited pool of
available assistants from which she needs to find an assistant
for each side, the trial counsel should do her best to ensure
each side has a specialist (an Expert B). If she only gives
the defense a generalist (an Expert A, then the trial counsel
should be wary in how she uses her specialist (an Expert B).
In United States v. Lloyd,8 another expert assistant case,
two groups of guys got in a fight in a bar. One group
consisted of appellant Lloyd and James. James was the one
who actually started the fight. The appellant only joined in
after the fists started flying. The second group included
Jance, Gee, and Soto. The five men were very close
together during the fight, and no more than two or three feet
apart. The bouncers broke up the fight and when Jance, Gee
and Soto took off, each realized that they had been stabbed
during the fight. None of the three saw a knife or knew who
did the stabbing. The question was who did the stabbing-
appellant or James.79
After hearing a news report about the fight, James came
forward to the police, said that the appellant admitted
stabbing the three victims, and gave the police a blood-
covered shirt that the appellant wore that night. Subsequent
DNA testing showed that a victim's blood was on the shirt.
James said he threw out his own blood-soaked shirt. James
later testified at trial that his pants were soaked with blood
down to his boxer shorts-but that night, he gave a pair of
pants to investigators that he said he wore during the fight
which only had one spot of blood on them. 0
The defense requested expert assistance from a blood
splatter expert, which the government denied. Looking at
Table 3 in the appendix, we see the test for appointing expert
assistants is necessity-that there must be a reasonable
probability that the expert would (1) be of assistance to the
defense and (2) denial of expert would result in
76 id.
72 Id. at 380-81.
7 3 Id. at 381-83.
74 Id. at 383.
7 Id. at 384.
78 69 M.J. 95 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
7 Id. at 97, 101-03 (Effron, C.J., dissenting).
80 Id.
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fundamentally unfair trial. For the first prong, the defense
needs to show why the expert is needed, what the expert
would accomplish, and why the defense cannot do it
themselves. In its motion before the military judge, the
defense argued:
15. A forensic scientist is relevant and
necessary because the government intends
to present testing results on DNA as
evidence of guilt. It is anticipated that the
government's expert witness will discuss
the location of the blood on the shirt and
who matched the DNA contained on the
shirt. DNA analysis can only confirm that
genetic makeup of physical evidence, not
how it came to be on the evidence seized.
As a result of that presentation of
evidence, the defense is free to explore
theories of the case that the government
may not be pursuing as it pertains to this
relevant physical evidence. That would
include exploring all possibilities as to
how the blood came to be on the shirt that
SrA Lloyd was wearing at the time of the
altercation. There are no witnesses in this
case who can testify to seeing SrA Lloyd
stab anyone. The case hinges upon an
alleged confession to an interested party
and on blood evidence on SrA Lloyd's
clothing. The consultant currently
provided to the defense is not qualified to
provide information or testify as to
bloodstain spatters....
16. To the extent that SrA Lloyd was
apparently in the proximity of the area
where the altercation occurred, the defense
must understand and potentially present
expert testimony on the manner in which
blood spatters from a stab wound.
Depending on a number of factors which
the defense intends to pursue through an
expert, blood may spatter a significant
distance from a stab wound. For this
reason, presence of an alleged victim's
blood on the clothing may be far less
significant than intuition, or even theories
the government intends to explore,
suggests. To mount an effective defense,
the defense must understand the physics of
bloodstain patterns to either rule out or
present such a theory. This is crucial to
testing the government's theory of the case
and for the presentation of evidence on
behalf of SrA Lloyd. Neither member of
the defense has the requisite training or
experience to understand this complex
field without the assistance of an expert. 1
Many practitioners might agree that this was a compelling
request. While the request began by stating the wrong test,
citing the necessary and relevant test from the rules for
producing expert witnesses, the request did generally
address the requirements for the appointment of expert
assistants. However, the military judge denied the motion.
The military judge stated that while the defense might have
shown what the expert would accomplish and why the
defense could not do it themselves, they failed to show why
the expert was needed.8 2
At trial, the government called James to the stand, who
testified that appellant did it, and also had victims Jance,
Gee and Soto testify about what they saw. The government
also introduced the lab results through a stipulation of
expected testimony. The stipulation said that the results did
not explain how the blood got on the appellant's shirt and
that all it showed was that appellant was in proximity to a
bleeding victim. The defense introduced a witness who said
she saw James make a stabbing motion and introduced
witnesses that testified that appellant was a peaceful person,
while James was untruthful. The panel found appellant
guilty and sentenced him to one year confinement and a bad
conduct discharge.83
On appeal, the CAAF checked whether the military
judge abused her discretion when she applied the tests for
appointing expert assistants. Looking at prior case law, we
might expect that the CAAF would have reversed. Two
recent cases, United States v. McAllister84 and United States
v. Warner,8 5 have suggested that such cases are appropriate
for expert assistance because the rapid growth in forensic
science techniques at trial may make these cases more
complex than general practitioners can handle on their own.
Additionally, in United States v. Lee,86 the CAAF noted that
the playing field is uneven when the government benefits
from scientific evidence and expert testimony and the
defense is denied a necessary expert to prepare for and
respond to the government's expert. In Lloyd, the defense
made a similar argument.
I Id. at 97-98 (emphasis added).
82 Id. at 98.
83 Id.
84 55 M.J. 270, 275 (C.A.A.F. 2001).
8s 62 M.J. 114, 118 (C.A.A.F. 2005).
86 64 M.J. 213 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
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However, the court distinguished the
McAllister/Warner/Lee line of cases, stating that those cases
only require a reciprocal expert if the government expert's
testimony is a linchpin of the government's case. Here, the
court said, the government expert's testimony was not a
linchpin of the case.
Further, the court found that the defense did not provide
the military judge with a precise enough theory for the
military judge to determine whether expert assistance was
needed to further that theory. While appellate defense
counsel argued on appeal that the expert's analysis might
have shown that James was the stabber or that appellant did
not do the stabbing, defense counsel at trial did not make
that explicit argument. The court focused on the language in
the defense's motion, noting that the assertion "exploring all
possibilities" was not good enough, and the defense must
also show a reasonable probability that the expert is needed.
The court implied that if the defense had made that explicit
statement at trial (that James was the stabber, not the
appellant), then the judge might have abused her discretion
by turning down the request.88
In the dissent, Chief Judge Effron, joined by Judge
Baker, argued that the blood spatter theory was obviously
central to the defense theory of the case; the defense could
not have been more explicit about the necessity for an expert
assistant; and declared that the defense motion "explained
the need for an expert in clear and compelling terms."89 The
DNA was key: there was no meaningful eyewitness
testimony and the only other direct evidence came from
James, who had a self-interest in the outcome. 90
Arguably, the government really only had the DNA
evidence-and therefore this case falls within the
McAllister/Warner/Lee line of cases. While an expert
assistant could not directly rebut the government's expert
testimony that the victim's DNA was on appellant's shirt, it
could help to explain to the factfinder how that blood may
have gotten on that shirt. The dissenters argued:
Who stabbed the three airmen? No one
saw any stabbing. No one saw a knife.
None of the victims felt any stabbing
during the altercation. Was it Stafford
Joseph James, the person who started the
altercation, fought with two of the victims,
destroyed his own blood-soaked shirt
before it could be tested, whose pants did
not match his previous testimony and had
S Lloyd, 69 M.J. at 100.
sId. at 100-01.
89 Id. at 102 (Effron, C.J., dissenting).
90 Id.
no blood from the altercation on him, did
nothing to report the incident until he
heard about the police investigation, and
then immediately placed the blame on
Appellant? Or was it Appellant, who
belatedly entered the altercation, was
identified as being in a fight with only one
victim, and whose admissions were
attributable to Stafford Joseph James? 91
The dissenters concluded, "In a close case, the defense was
denied the opportunity to explore the potential for expert
testimony on the critical issue of guilt or innocence."92
Perhaps the central issue in this case was not how the
blood got on the appellant's shirt, but whether the defense
could put on its case without the use of an expert assistant.
The military judge conceded the second and third Gonzalez
factors to the defense-namely, what the expert would
accomplish for the defense and why the defense could not do
the work themselves. 93 This effectively forced the CAAF to
resolve the case by looking at the first Gonzalez factor (why
the expert assistance is necessary), 94 which appears to have
been satisfied by the defense in this case. The majority may
have upheld appellant's conviction because they believed the
defense could argue how the blood got on the appellant's
shirt without the use of expert assistance (the second
Gonzalez factor). To support this theory, the defense
counsel appeared to make the same arguments outlined by
the dissent above-all without having any expert assistance.
The defense did not need an expert to argue common sense:
in a close-quarters fight like this, blood is likely to get
everywhere. Indeed, the court-martial found that the
appellant was the stabber-but James himself was also
covered in blood. The defense was able to present its theory,
the panel merely rejected it. The lesson learned for defense
counsel is to clearly articulate your theory of the case, and to
explain how the evidence sought will either advance your
theory or rebut the government's theory (or both).
Conclusion
The discovery and production issues analyzed by the
military appellate courts during the 2009 term are similar to
the issues military legal practitioners regularly face. The
key to solving these problems is to keep the rules straight
and apply them with precision.
Recognize whether you are dealing with a discovery
issue or a production issue. Understand that a basic
91 Id. at 103.
93 Id. at 98; United States v. Gonzalez, 39 M.J. 459 (C.M.A. 1991).
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preliminary question in your discovery analysis is, "Where
are the requested matters?" Finally, be able to distinguish
between the definitions of material or necessary and
understand how these definitions apply to the issues in your
case. If you use the tools discussed in this article, you will
be well-equipped to apply a precise analysis every time.
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Appendix
Table 1. Basic Differences between Discovery and Production
RCM 701(a)(2) RCM 703
Timing Pretrial preparation and investigation Presentation of witnesses and evidence at trial
Test Material to the preparation of the defense; Necessary (not cumulative, positively contributes to an issue)
intended for use by trial counsel in case-in- and relevant (MRE 401)
chief; or taken from or belonging to the
accused
Agency or Possession, custody, control of military Military witnesses-by order; civilian witnesses-by
Person authorities subpoena; government-controlled evidence-notify custodian;
other evidence-by subpoena
Table 2. Differences between Discovery and Production In Camera Reviews
RCM 701(g)(2) RCM 703(f)(4)(C)
Proponent A party The custodian
Test Sufficient showing that disclosure would be Compliance with the subpoena would be unreasonable or
inappropriate oppressive
Timing Before decision on the value of the matter in After the decision on the value of the matter in question (the
question (the value of the matter is part of value of the matter has already been determined)
the analysis)
Relief to The military judge may prescribe such terms The military judge can modify or withdraw the subpoena;
party that is and conditions as are just this may trigger unavailable evidence analysis under RCM
denied the 703(f)(2)
matter
Table 3. Differences Between Expert Assistance and Expert Witnesses
Expert Assistance Expert Witnesses (RCM 703(d))
Timing Pretrial preparation and investigation Trial testimony
Test Necessary: reasonable probability that the Necessary (not cumulative, positively contributes to an
expert would (1) be of assistance to the issue) and relevant (IRE 401)
defense (why is expert needed, what would
expert accomplish, and why the defense
cannot do it themselves); and (2) denial of
expert would result in fundamentally unfair
trial
Table 4. Differences between Specific Discovery Requests and RCM 701(a)(6)IBrady Obligations
RCM 701(a)(2) RCM 701(a)(6)/Brady
Test Material to the preparation of the defense; Evidence that reasonably tends to be favorable
intended for use by trial counsel in case-in-
chief; or taken from or belonging to the
accused
When Upon request As soon as practicable
Location Possession, custody, control of military Investigative files, including personnel files of investigators
authorities (trial counsel, investigative agencies associated with or
closely aligned with the case, or unrelated cases if put on
notice by the defense)
Review Harmless beyond a reasonable doubt Material (reasonable probability of a different result); if
prosecutorial misconduct or a specific discovery request
under RCM 701, then harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
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